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Secret U.S. Report Details Policy in Dominican Crisis

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WASHINGTON, Nov. 13—The Johnson Administration wants to keep secret its testimony to the Senate that threw new light on its intervention in the Dominican Republic last

spring. It fears that publication of the record would rekindle a bitter debate and furnish new ammunition to its critics.

That testimony, drawn last summer by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from high officials of the State and Defense Departments and the Central Intelligence Agency, produced evidence of the following:

¶That the United States explicitly solicited from a rump military junta in the Dominican Republic the urgent request last April 28 that it send troops to protect American lives.

¶That at the start of the Dominican civil war last April 24 the Administration decided that only the military could effectively prevent a Communist takeover. It worked behind the scenes to bolster the military forces while still professing non-intervention, but was prepared to use its own troops if the rebels gained the upper hand.

Record Is Voluminous

¶That the United States was determined to prevent the return of former President Juan Bosch and to prevent a victory by his rebel supporters because it believed that they had made "an effective alliance" with Dominican Communists.

¶That after landing 21,000 troops in the Dominican capital in what was then described as a neutral peace-keeping operation, the Administration seriously considered an attack to wipe out the rebel force and was deterred only because of the high number of casualties it would have inflicted on women and children.

¶That even before the revolt the United States gave not only extensive economic aid but also political advice to the civilian junta of Donald Reid Cabral even though it knew from its own public-opinion polls that the junta had no popular support and was planning to cancel elections scheduled for September. The United States let the C. I. A. train the police force

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U.S. DATA DETAIL DOMINICAN POLICY

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and warned the Cabral junta of Mr. Bosch's "endemic plotting."

The voluminous record of the Senate's inquiry last July into the decision to land troops in Santo Domingo remains locked in the files of the Foreign Relations Committee. The Administration was given a promise by the chairman, Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, that it could edit the testimony before it was published.

Instead of pressing for publication, the State Department produced a white paper covering much of the same material. However, the paper is also still secret. It is more clearly aimed at justifying rather than explaining the intervention and does not make some of the major points developed at the hearings.

Mr. Fulbright, in criticizing the intervention, has fallen into an almost personal feud with President Johnson's principal adviser on Latin America, Thomas C. Mann, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Their argument at the hearings has continued in public speeches, but neither has published the written record upon which their rival interpretations rest.

Mann the Key Witness

Several sources have said the Administration's desire to keep the Senate record secret was a principal reason for not publishing the white paper.

Though it is much more disjointed than the 60-page white paper, the testimony to the Senate Committee provides a deeper insight into the attitudes and motives of Administration policymakers as they watched the crisis develop and traded urgent messages with the embassy in Santo Domingo.

Mr. Mann was the main witness. Among the other contributors to the Senate record the most important are said to have been Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Vice Adm. William F. Raborn Jr., Director of Central Intelligence.

Persons familiar with their testimony have extracted from the record the following roughly chronological account of Administration attitudes and activities in the crisis:

The C.I.A. knew of four plots in March and April well before the start of the rebellion against

against the civilian junta led by Mr. Reid Cabral. These plots were traced to Mr. Bosch, the only legally elected President of the last 35 years, who was deposed by a military coup d'état in September, 1963.

Mr. Bosch, in exile in Puerto Rico, was officially appraised as an incompetent "poet-professor type" and a "do-gooder," who in common "with many Latin-American politicians," according to Mr. Mann, "would make an allowance with the devil himself if he thought it would get him into office."

In his alleged plotting, Mr.

Bosch was said to have signed an agreement with the left wing of a small Dominican Socialist Christian party. Moreover, according to intelligence information, he "reportedly told" a representative of a pro-Castro group in the spring of 1964 that he needed and wanted its support.

This and other information about meetings of Dominicans was said to have persuaded Washington that Mr. Bosch and his followers, though not themselves Communists, had entered a "coalition" with the Castroites, who in turn solicited support from two Dominican Marxist parties.

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